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Abstract. Hillas (1990) introduced a deﬁnition of strategic stability based on
perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisﬁes all of the
requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point
out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction
properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a
stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the
results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS
property.
Key words: Game Theory, Nash equilibrium, Stable sets, Admissibility of
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1. Introduction
The theory of strategic stability originates from the theory of reﬁnements
of Nash equilibrium. Reﬁnements were usually designed to eliminate Nash
equilibria that (for whatever reason) did not look like the ‘‘right’’ solution
for the game under consideration. The problem with this approach was
that this way reﬁnements got designed on a rather ad hoc basis. They
tended to cure one speciﬁc problem of Nash equilibrium, but usually still,
like the notion of Nash equilibrium itself, did not solve various other
problems.
The theory of strategic stability is geared towards a more systematic ap-
proach of equilibrium selection. First a number of desirable properties of the
equilibrium to be selected is chosen. The next step is to try to ﬁnd a notion of
strategic stability that satisﬁes all these properties. The selection criterion is
usually deﬁned in terms of an appropriate way to perturb the game.
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NetherlandsOne such attempt, based on the requirements for strategic stability as they
were originally formulated in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), is given in Hillas
(1991). He uses perturbations of the best reply correspondence of a game as a
means to test for strategic stability. Hillas (1991) claims that the resulting type
of strategic stability satisﬁes all requirements. Nevertheless, Hillas et. al
(2001) point out that the proofs of iterated dominance and forward induction,
both requirements involving the deletion of a certain type of pure strategy
from the game, were not correct. They proceed to give an alternative proof of
a property called independence of inadmissible strategies. This property implies
both iterated dominance and forward induction.
Since the proof of the IIS property of best reply stability in Hillas et. al
(2001) is based on results obtained earlier in that paper, the proof of this
property is fairly elaborate though. In this note we present a direct, and much
shorter, proof of the IIS property of best reply stability.
Notation: For k 2 N, K ¼f 1;2;...;kg and Rk is the vector space of k-tuples
of real numbers. For a ﬁnite set T, DðTÞ denotes the set of probability dis-
tributions on T. For x 2 Rk, kxk¼maxfjxijj1   i   kg. For a set C   Rk,




BeðxÞ. For a subset C of Rk, the convex hull of C is denoted by
chðCÞ. For two nonempty, compact sets C and D in Rk,
dHðC;DÞ¼maxfkx   ykjx 2 C;y 2 Dg is the Hausdorﬀ distance between C
and D.
2. Preliminaries
A( ﬁnite n-person) game (in normal form) is a pair
C ¼h A;ui:
The ﬁnite set A is the Cartesian product
Q
i2N Ai where Ai is the set of pure
strategies of player i. The vector u ¼ð uiÞi2N lists the payoﬀ functions
ui : A ! R for the players i in N.
The set of mixed strategies of player i is Di ¼ DðAiÞ. We will abuse nota-
tion and simply write ai for the mixed strategy that puts all weight on the pure
strategy ai.
The expected payoﬀ of a strategy proﬁle x 2 D ¼
Q








The strategy proﬁle where player i uses strategy yi 2 Di and his opponents
play x i ¼ð xjÞj6¼i is denoted by ðx ijyiÞ. For player i and a strategy proﬁle x in
D a strategy yi 2 Di is called a best reply to x if
uiðx ijyiÞ uiðx ijziÞ
holds for all zi 2 Di. A strategy proﬁle x 2 D is called a Nash equilibrium of C
if xi is a best reply to x for each player i. The set of best replies for player i to x
is denoted by BRiðxÞ. The correspondence BR:D ! ! D deﬁned by
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Y
j2N
BRjðxÞð x 2 DÞ
is called the best reply correspondence of C.
Selten (1975) introduced perfect equilibria as a reﬁnement of the set of
Nash equilibria of C. Take a positive number g and a completely mixed
strategy proﬁle x (i.e. all coordinates are positive). The proﬁle x is called
g-perfect if for each player j 2 N and pure strategy aj in Aj,
xjaj < g whenever ujðx jjajÞ < ujðx jjbjÞ for some bj 2 Aj:
A strategy proﬁle x is called perfect if there is a sequence ðgkÞk2N of positive
real numbers converging to zero and a sequence ðxkÞk2R of completely mixed
strategy proﬁles converging to x such that xk is gk-perfect.
3. BR-stable sets of equilibria
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) initiated a search for solution concepts that
satisfy a number of stability requirements. They argued that these require-
ments were needed for a solution in order to be ‘‘well behaved’’. Such a ‘‘well
behaved’’ solution concept is called a stability concept. However, none of the
three candidate stability concepts introduced in their paper satisﬁed all the
minimum requirements. This triggered a further search, in particular by
Mertens (1989, 1991) and Hillas (1990). In his paper Hillas presented an
alternative deﬁnition of stability, what we will call BR-stability. His deﬁnition
is repeated here, together with some basic facts on BR-stable sets that will be
useful in subsequent sections.
Let C be a game. The perturbation space H of C is the set of all (non-
empty) closed- and convex-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondences










A strategy proﬁle x 2 D is called a ﬁxed point of u 2 H if x 2 uðxÞ. The set of
ﬁxed points of u is denoted by fixðuÞ.
It is well known that the set of ﬁxed points of an element of H is not
empty (cf. Kakutani (1941)). Furthermore, the best reply correspondence BR
of the game C is an element of H and its set of ﬁxed points equals the set of
Nash equilibria of the game C.
Deﬁnition 1. A nonempty closed set S   D is called a BR-set of C if for every
neighborhood V of S there exists an e > 0 such that fixðuÞ\V is not empty
whenever dðBR;uÞ < e. A BR-set is called BR-stable if it is a connected set of
perfect equilibria.
Along with a number of properties of BR-stable sets, their existence is
established in Hillas (1990). In what is coming in this paper we need a
characterization of BR-stability in terms of completely mixed perturba-
tions.
A perturbation u in H is called completely mixed if uðxÞ only contains
completely mixed strategy proﬁles for every strategy proﬁle x 2 D.W ew i l l
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perturbations.
Lemma 1. For a closed set S   D, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) S is a BR-set
(2) for every neighborhood V of S there exists an e > 0 such that fixðuÞ\V is
not empty for any completely mixed element u of H with dðBR;uÞ < e.
4. An extension theorem
The proof of the IIS property of BR-stable sets presented in this note is based
on the following extension theorem for nonempty- compact-valued upper
hemicontinuous correspondences.
Theorem 1. Let X   Rm and Y   Rn be nonempty and compact. Let X0 be a
closed subset of X. Let b : X ! ! Y and u0:X0 ! ! Y be nonempty-
compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondences. Suppose further that
dHðbðxÞ;u0ðxÞÞ < d for all x in X0. Then there exists a nonempty-
compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence
u:X ! ! Y
whose restriction to X0 equals u0 and dðb;uÞ 2d.
Proof: For z 2 X0 and k 2 N, deﬁne the open neighborhood OkðzÞ X of z by
OkðzÞ¼Bk 1ðzÞ\
 






OkðzÞ. Now deﬁne A0 ¼ X n O1 and for k 2 N,
Ak ¼ Ok n Okþ1. Then, since X0 is closed in X, it is easy to see that the sets
X0;A0;A1;A2;......
form a partition of X. Deﬁne the correspondence u :X ! ! Y by
u ðxÞ¼




u0ðzÞ if x 2 Ak for some k 2 N




Using the fact that dðb;u0Þ < d, it is straightforward to show that the values
of u  are not empty. Let u:X ! ! Y be the correspondence whose graph is the
closure of the graph of u  in X   Y. Clearly, u is upper hemicontinuous and
nonempty- compact-valued, since its graph is closed in X   Y. Claim: its
restriction to X0 equals u0 and dðb;uÞ 2d.
(a) First we will show that uðxÞ¼u0ðxÞ for all x 2 X0. To this end, take an x in
X0. Note that u ðxÞ¼u0ðxÞ. Now take a sequence ðxm;ymÞm2N in X   Y
converging to ðx;yÞ for which ym is an element of u ðxmÞ. It suﬃces to
show that y is an element of u ðxÞ.
To this end, take a closed neighborhood F of u ðxÞ. It is suﬃcient to show
that y is an element of F, since u ðxÞ¼u0ðxÞ is compact.
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elements z of X0 in Bk 1ðxÞ it holds that u0ðzÞ is a subset of F. Furthermore,
O2kðxÞ is a (non-empty) neighborhood of x, so we can take M 2 N such that
xm 2 O2kðxÞ whenever m   M. Now take such an m   M. Because xm is an
element of O2kðxÞ, it is an element of either Al for some l   2k or of X0.





Therefore, since ym is an element of u ðxmÞ, we can ﬁnd an l   2k and a
zm 2 X0 such that xm 2 OlðzmÞ and ym 2 u0ðzmÞ. For this zm,
kx   zmk k x   xmkþk xm   zmk < ð2kÞ
 1 þ l 1   k 1:
Hence, by the choice of k, u ðzmÞ¼u0ðzmÞ is a subset of F. Thus we get
that ym is an element of F and, since m   M was arbitrary, also y is an
element of F.
(b) Secondly we will show that dðb;uÞ 2d. The proof is divided in two
parts.
(b1) First we will prove that for all x 2 X, uðxÞ is a subset of the closure
of B2dðbðxÞÞ. To this end, notice that u ðxÞ is a subset of B2dðbðxÞÞ
for all x 2 X. Therefore the graph of u, being the closure of the
graph of u , is a subset of the closure of the graph of the corre-
spondence that assigns B2dðbðxÞÞ to x. This however implies that
uðxÞ is a subset of the closure of B2dðbðxÞÞ for each x in X.
(b2) Next we will prove that bðxÞ is a subset of the closure of B2dðuðxÞÞ
for all x 2 X.I fx is an element of A0, then bðxÞ is clearly a subset of
B2dðbðxÞÞ   B2dðu ðxÞÞ   B2dðuðxÞÞ:
If x is an element of X0, then – since dHðbðxÞ;u0ðxÞÞ < d by assumption – bðxÞ
is a subset of
B2dðu0ðxÞÞ ¼ B2dðu ðxÞÞ   B2dðuðxÞÞ:
So suppose that x is an element of Ak for some k 2 N and take an element y of
bðxÞ. We will show that there exists an element w of u ðxÞ with ky   wk 2d.
Since x is an element of Ak   Ok, there is an element z of X0 with x 2 OkðzÞ.
Therefore y is an element of bðxÞ Bk 1dðbðzÞÞ by the deﬁnition of OkðzÞ . This
implies that we can ﬁnd an element w of u0ðzÞ with ky   wk1 < 2d since
dHðbðzÞ;u0ðzÞÞ < d by assumption. However, since y is an element of bðxÞ,
ky   wk1 < 2d implies that w is also an element of B2dðbðxÞÞ. Hence, w is an
element of u ðxÞ which is what we wanted to show. n
Independence of inadmissible strategies
Originally Kohlberg and Mertens required that a stability concept should
satisfy, among other conditions, iterated dominance and forward induction.
However, both these conditions are implied by independence of inadmissible
strategies and the extension theorem of the previous section enables us to
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inadmissible strategies in this note instead of using the original requirements.
A strategy yi of player i is an admissible best reply against an element x 2 D
if there is a sequence ðxkÞk2N of completely mixed strategy proﬁles in D
converging to x such that yi 2 BRiðxkÞ for all k. For a subset S of D, a pure
strategy bj of player j is called an inadmissible reply against S if bj is not an
admissible best reply against any strategy proﬁle x in S.
Loosely speaking, independence of inadmissible strategies means that a
stable set S of a game C remains stable when a pure inadmissible reply against
S is deleted from C.
In order to get a more formal treatment, we need to introduce some
terminology. Let C ¼h A;ui be a game and let bj be a pure strategy of player j.
The restricted game C0 of C is the game that results when the pure strategy bj
of player j is removed from player j’s set of pure strategies.
Notice that we can simply identify the game C0 with the game that results
if we allow player j only to use those strategies xj in Dj for which xjbj ¼ 0.
Therefore, we will denote the set of strategy proﬁles in D in which the pure
strategy bj of player j is played with zero probability by D
0 and view D
0 as
being the strategy space of C0.
Theorem 2 (IIS). Let S be a BR-stable set of C and suppose that the pure
strategy bj of player j in C is an inadmissible reply against S. Then S is a subset
of D
0 and a BR-set of the restricted game C0.
Proof: Take a BR-stable set S of C. Since S is a collection of perfect equilibria
and bj is an inadmissible reply against S, it is clear that S is a subset of D
0.
Furthermore, let BR and BR0 denote the respective best reply correspon-
dences of C and C0 and similarly distinguish between H and H0.
In order to show that S is even a BR-set of C0, take a neighborhood V 0 of S
in D
0. Take a neighborhood V of S in D whose restriction to D
0 equals V 0.
Furthermore, since bj is an inadmissible reply against S, we can w.l.o.g. assume
V to be suﬃciently small to guarantee that bj is not a best reply against any
completely mixed strategy proﬁle in V . Let W denote the closure of V .
Now, since S is a BR-set of the game C, there exists an e > 0 such that
fixðuÞ\V is not empty whenever dðBR;uÞ < e.
Take such an e and take a completely mixed element u0 in H0 with
dðBR0;u0Þ < 1
2e. By lemma 1 it suﬃces to show that u0 has a ﬁxed point in V 0.
First notice that the correspondence b : W ! ! D
0 deﬁned by
bðxÞ :¼ BRðxÞ\D
0 ðx 2 W Þ
is compact- and convex-valued upper hemicontinuous. Moreover, its values
are not empty because bj is not a best reply against any completely mixed
strategy proﬁle in V . Next, let W 0 be the restriction of W to D
0.I ti s
straightforward to check that bðxÞ is a subset of BR0ðxÞ for any element x of
W 0. However, again because bj is not a best reply against any completely
mixed strategy proﬁle in V , the converse also holds. Hence, b equals BR0 on
W 0 and we get that dHðbðxÞ;u0ðxÞÞ < 1
2e for all x in W 0. Thus, taking X ¼ W ,
X0 ¼ W 0 and Y ¼ D
0 theorem 1 tells us that there exists a non-empty- com-
pact-valued and hemicontinuous extension
u  : W ! ! D
0
376 J. Hillas et al.of u0 such that dðb;u Þ < e on W . Of course we can in addition assume
w.l.o.g. that u  has convex values. Now let
G :¼f x 2 Djbj 2 BRjðxÞg
be the collection of strategy proﬁles against which bj is a best reply. Fur-
thermore, take an arbitrary completely mixed element b
  in H with
dðBR;b
 Þ < e. Deﬁne a new correspondence u from D to D by
uðxÞ :¼
b
 ðxÞ if x= 2W










This is clearly an upper hemicontinuous correspondence whose values are not
empty, convex and compact. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that
dðBR;uÞ < e. So, by the choice of e it has a ﬁxed point, say x ,i nV .
We will ﬁrst show that x  must be an element of D
0. Suppose it is not. We
will derive a contradiction.
So, we will ﬁrst show that x  is not an element of G. In order to do that,
suppose that x  is an element of G. In that case x  is an element of the convex
hull of u ðx Þ[b
 ðx Þ. Thus, since all values of u  are subsets of D
0 and x  is
not by assumption, x  can be written as
x  ¼ ky þð 1   kÞz
for certain proﬁles y in u ðx Þ and z in b
 ðx Þ and 0   k < 1. In particular,
since b
  is completely mixed and k < 1, x  must be completely mixed. How-
ever, since x  is an element of V , this means that bj cannot be a best reply
against x  by the choice of V . This contradicts the assumption that x  is an
element of G.
So, x  is not an element of G. Thus, since it is an element of V , the
deﬁnition of u tells us that x  must be an element of u ðx Þ. However, u  only
takes values in D
0. Hence, x  must be an element of D
0.
Finally, notice that this implies that x  is a ﬁxed point of u0 by the con-
struction of u . Moreover, since x  is an element of both D
0 and V ,i ti s
necessarily an element of V 0. Thus, u0 has a ﬁxed point in V 0, which is what we
wanted to show. n
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